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Summary
On February 1, 2003, NASA’s Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart while returning
to Earth from a 16-day science mission in orbit.  All seven astronauts — six Americans
and one Israeli — were killed.  An investigation is underway.  This report provides
quick facts about Columbia, her crew, the STS-107 mission, the status of the
investigation, and a brief discussion of issues for Congress.  Additional information on
the space shuttle program is available in CRS Issue Brief IB93062, CRS Report
RS21411, and CRS Report RS21419.  This report will be updated regularly.
The Loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia
The space shuttle Columbia was launched on its STS-107 mission on January 16,
2003.  After completing a 16-day scientific research mission, Columbia started its descent
to Earth on the morning of February 1, 2003.   As it descended from orbit, approximately
16 minutes before its scheduled landing at Kennedy Space Center, FL,  Columbia broke
apart over northeastern Texas.  All seven astronauts aboard were killed.  They were
Commander Rick Husband; Pilot William McCool; Mission Specialists Michael P.
Anderson, David M. Brown, Kalpana Chawla, and Laurel Clark; and payload specialist
Ilan Ramon, an Israeli.  The last communication with Columbia was at about 09:00 EST.
The shuttle was at an altitude of 207,135 feet, traveling at a speed of Mach 18.3 (about
13,000 miles per hour).
Accident Investigators: NASA and CAIB
NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe immediately appointed an internal “Mishap
Investigation Board,” (MIB)  and also an external group, the “Columbia Accident
Investigation Board” (CAIB), to investigate the accident.  MIB was replaced by the
NASA Accident Investigation Team (NAIT) on March 21, 2003.  Much of the
information NASA is releasing to the public can be obtained at
[http://www.nasa.gov/columbia/].  
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The CAIB is chaired by Adm. (Ret.) Harold Gehman, former NATO Supreme
Allied Commander, Atlantic, and has its own Web site [http://www.caib.us].  NASA
transitioned responsibility for the investigation to the CAIB on February 6. The Board
anticipates issuing its report in late August.  NASA revised the Board’s charter three
times to clarify its independence from NASA, primarily in response to congressional
concerns.  However, the CAIB was created by NASA, includes NASA representatives,
and new Board members must be appointed by the NASA Administrator, so concerns
about its independence continue.  Another criticism is that the members of the Board who
were not government employees at the time they were chosen were then hired as Special
Government Employees.  Since that means that all the Board members now are
government employees, the Board is not subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA), thereby restricting public access to meetings and records.  Furthermore, the
Board members are being paid with NASA funds, which critics contend may influence
their judgment.  Representative Gordon has introduced H.R. 2450 that specifies how such
investigation boards should be created and operate in the future.  Another controversy is
that the Board has conducted interviews with NASA and contractor employees on a
confidential basis, and the Board did not want the results of those interviews disclosed to
Congress or the public.  House Science Committee Chairman Boehlert and Ranking
Member Hall announced June 13 that agreement had been reached with CAIB giving
certain Members and designated staff of the Science Committee, as well as the Senate
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, access to the interviews. 
The Space Shuttle Columbia
The Space Transportation System (STS)—the space shuttle—consists of an airplane-
like orbiter, two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) on either side, and a large cylindrical
External Tank that holds the fuel for the orbiter’s main engines.  The SRBs detach from
the orbiter 2 ½ minutes after launch when their fuel is spent, fall into the ocean, and are
recovered for refurbishment and reuse.   The External Tank is not reused.  It is jettisoned
as the orbiter reaches Earth orbit, and disintegrates as it falls into the Indian Ocean.
Columbia was one of four flightworthy reusable space shuttle orbiters in NASA’s
fleet.  The others are Discovery, Atlantis, and Endeavour.  A fifth orbiter, Challenger, was
lost in a 1986 accident. Another orbiter, Enterprise, was used for approach and landing
tests in the 1970s and was not designed to travel in space.  Enterprise now belongs to the
Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum.
Columbia was the first spaceflight-worthy orbiter built for NASA by Rockwell
International (the space division of Rockwell, which built the orbiters, was later bought
by Boeing ). It was used for the very first shuttle flight on April 12, 1981. The STS-107
mission that ended tragically on February 1, 2003 was Columbia’s 28th flight.  Although
Columbia was the oldest orbiter, Discovery has been used for more flights (30).  Orbiters
are periodically taken out of service for maintenance and overhaul.  Columbia underwent
an inspection and retrofit program from August 1991-February 1992, was in an “orbiter
maintenance down period” in 1994-1995, and an “orbiter major modification” (OMM)
period in 1999-2001. STS-107 was its second flight after the OMM.
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Columbia’s STS-107 Crew
Commander: Air Force Colonel Rick D. Husband, b. July 12, 1957, Amarillo, TX.
Married, two children.  He had piloted STS-96.
Pilot:  Navy Commander William “Willie” McCool, b. September 23, 1961, San
Diego, CA.  Married, three children.  This was his first spaceflight.
Payload Commander/Mission Specialist 3: Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Michael
P. Anderson, b. December 25, 1959, Plattsburgh, NY.  Married. two children.  He also
had flown on STS-89. 
Mission Specialist 1: Navy Captain David M. Brown, b. April 16, 1956, Arlington,
VA.  Single.  This was his first spaceflight. 
Mission Specialist 2: Dr. Kalpana Chawla, b. July 1, 1961, Karnal, India.  Married.  Dr.
Chawla was a naturalized U.S. citizen, and also had flown on STS-87.
Mission Specialist 4: Navy Commander (captain-select) Laurel Blair Salton Clark,
b. March 10, 1961, Ames, Iowa, but considered Racine, WI as her hometown.  Married,
one child.  STS-107 was her first spaceflight.
Payload Specialist: Colonel, Israeli Air Force, Ilan Ramon, b. June 20, 1954, Tel
Aviv, Israel.  Married, four children.  STS-107 was his first spaceflight.
The STS-107 Mission
STS-107 was a scientific research mission that, unlike most current shuttle launches,
was not related to the International Space Station (ISS) program. The launch of STS-107
had been delayed for a variety of reasons since the summer of 2001.  STS-107 carried a
SPACEHAB Double Module in the shuttle’s cargo bay, which allows astronauts to
conduct scientific experiments in a “shirt-sleeve” environment.   The crew, working
round-the-clock, conducted a research program involving 32 payloads, with 59 separate
investigations.  SPACEHAB marketed 18% of the module’s capacity to international and
industry commercial users, while NASA experiments made up the remaining 82%.
Students from six schools in Australia, China, Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, and the United
States probed the effects of spaceflight on spiders, silkworms, inorganic crystals, fish,
bees, and ants, respectively.  Other experiments were attached to the outside of the
SPACEHAB Double Module, including the Mediterranean Israeli Dust Experiment which
involved observations of Israel from space.  Some of the research required analysis of
specimens and data sets after the shuttle returned to Earth, and they were destroyed along
with the crew and orbiter.  Other data,  however, were transmitted to ground-based
researchers during the flight, and a few specimens were retrieved among the debris, so
some of the research survived.  Quantifying the amount is difficult
Previous Crew Fatalities During Space Missions
The United States has suffered two other spaceflight-related accidents that caused
astronaut fatalities.  On January 27, 1967, the three-man crew—Virgil “Gus” Grissom,
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Edward White, and Roger Chaffee—of the first Apollo mission died when a fire erupted
in their Apollo command module during a pre-launch test. A NASA investigation
determined that electrical arcing in spacecraft wiring caused the fire. Apollo flights
resumed 21 months later.
On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger (STS 51-L) exploded 73 seconds
after launch, killing all seven astronauts aboard: Francis “Dick” Scobee, Michael Smith,
Judith Resnik, Ellison Onizuka, Ronald McNair, Gregory Jarvis (a payload specialist from
Hughes Aircraft), and schoolteacher Christa McAuliffe.  President Reagan appointed a
special commission to investigate the accident, chaired by former Secretary of State
William Rogers.  The Rogers Commission determined that cold weather at the launch site
caused a rubber “O-ring” in one of the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) to fail, allowing
gases to escape, resulting in a catastrophic explosion. The shuttle system was grounded
for 32 months while NASA redesigned the SRBs.  The shuttle returned to flight in
September 1988.  Congress appropriated $2.1 billion to build a replacement for
Challenger.  The new orbiter, Endeavour, made its first flight in May 1992.
Four Soviet cosmonauts also died during spaceflights.  Cosmonaut Vladimir
Komarov died during the first Soyuz flight on April 24, 1969.  The spacecraft’s
parachutes did not function properly and it struck the ground with great force, killing
Colonel Komarov.  Soviet human spaceflights were suspended for 18 months while the
Soviets investigated and remedied the problem.  Three cosmonauts died on Soyuz 11 on
June 29, 1971 when an improperly sealed valve allowed the spacecraft’s atmosphere to
vent into space.  The cosmonauts — Georgiy Dobrovolskiy, Vladislav Volkov, and Viktor
Patsayev — were not wearing spacesuits, and were asphyxiated.  There were no Soviet
human spaceflights for 27 months while modifications were made to the spacecraft.
Status of the Columbia Accident Investigation
On May 6, the CAIB released a “Working Scenario” that represents the Board’s and
NASA’s understanding of events leading to Columbia’s breakup.  The working scenario
is that the shuttle began its reentry into Earth’s atmosphere with unknown damage to a
reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) panel along the front of the left wing, or to a “Tee seal”
connecting two RCC panels.  A breach occurred in the wing soon after the shuttle first
encountered the atmosphere, and as the shuttle continued its descent, the increasingly
superheated air surrounding the shuttle entered the wing through the breach, burning
through the wing’s structure.  As the wing failed, its shape deformed, causing exterior
materials (such as tiles) to detach and changing the aerodynamics of the shuttle. The
orbiter’s maneuvering engines fired to compensate for increased drag on the left side, but
could not control the orbiter as damage progressed.  The vehicle ultimately broke apart
due to aerodynamic forces.  
The CAIB has not taken an official position on how the breach occurred, but some
members of the Board have said publicly that they believe the most probable cause was
a piece of insulating foam that fell off the shuttle’s External Tank and struck the orbiter’s
left wing 82 seconds after launch.  The day after the launch, NASA experts reviewing
footage of the launch discerned something hitting the orbiter.  During Columbia’s
mission, Boeing analyzed what damage might have been caused by the object, thought to
be insulating foam, to protective tiles that form part of the shuttle’s thermal protection.
Boeing concluded that the impact of the debris created no safety of flight issue.  The
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analysis apparently did not assess potential damage to the RCC panels.   Insulating foam
is the leading candidate for what hit the orbiter, but it may have been ice or a heavier
insulating material.  The CAIB conducted several tests where similar size pieces of foam
were shot at fiberglass models or RCC to determine the effects on the RCC panels and
their supporting framework at different velocities and impact angles.  In the final test, a
16 x 17 inch  hole was created when a piece of foam hit an RCC panel that had flown into
space 27 times on Atlantis. One CAIB member called the result a “smoking gun.” 
Some shuttle engineers suggested that NASA ask the Department of Defense to
image the shuttle while it was in orbit with ground-based telescopes or satellites to gather
more data about the extent of damage.  NASA officials did not do so reportedly for
several reasons: the Boeing analysis indicated there was no safety of flight issue, images
taken on earlier flights were unhelpful, and the manager who could have formally
requested the images was not approached directly, and could not determine who was
asking for the images when she heard about it indirectly.  NASA now has an agreement
with the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) that NIMA will image the
shuttle on a routine “targets of opportunity” basis, and,  in an emergency, upon specific
request from NASA. 
NASA and the Board are assessing what could have been done if a determination had
been made that the tiles or RCC panels were damaged.  Originally, NASA officials stated
that nothing could have been done since the astronauts could not have repaired them in
orbit.   NASA Administrator O’Keefe emphasizes that NASA would have done
everything possible to save Columbia.  Because of the threat of terrorism, and the
presence of an Israeli astronaut on the mission, questions arose as to whether the loss of
Columbia could be attributed to terrorism.  Government officials stress that there is no
evidence that the tragedy could have been caused by terrorists.
CAIB Recommendations
The CAIB has issued five preliminary recommendations:  (1) prior to the shuttle’s
return to flight, NASA should develop and implement a comprehensive inspection plan
to assess the structural integrity of the RCC panels, supporting structure, and attaching
hardware; (2) NASA should modify the arrangement it recently reached with NIMA
(discussed above) so that on-orbit imaging of each shuttle flight is a standard requirement;
(3) NASA should develop on-orbit capabilities for inspecting the shuttle for potential
damage to the thermal protection system (tiles and RCC), and making emergency repairs,
and, before the shuttle returns to flight, such capabilities should be developed to take
advantage of systems associated with the International Space Station, and an autonomous
capability for instances when the shuttle is in an orbit away from ISS; (4) NASA should
augment its ability to image the shuttle during its ascent to orbit; and (5) NASA should
obtain and downlink high resolution images of the External Tank after it separates from
the orbiter, and obtain and downlink high resolution images of the underside of the
orbiter’s leading edge and the forward section of both wings’ thermal protection systems.
Funding for the Investigation and Remedial Activities 
Congress included $50 million for the accident investigation and resulting remedial
actions in the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 108-7), in addition
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to the already-requested FY2003 funding for the shuttle program ($3.2 billion).   The
Administration requested another $50 million in the second FY2003 emergency
supplemental request (July 7, 2003), which was attached to the Senate-passed version of
the Legislative Branch Appropriations bill (H.R. 2657).  The House approved a
supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 2859) on July 25, but only for the Disaster Relief
Fund, not NASA or other purposes (see CRS Report RL31999).   The Senate passed that
measure on July 31.
Issues for Congress
Following is a brief list of questions framing the debate over Columbia and the
future of the human space flight program.  A key factor in evaluating many of these
questions is how long the shuttle system may be grounded, but that is not yet known.
• Was funding for the shuttle program adequate to ensure shuttle safety?
• Did NASA adequately respond to concerns expressed over the past several years by
the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel and others (see CRS Report RS21419) that the
shuttle program was under stress due to funding and workforce constraints?
• Did NASA adequately investigate damage that might have been caused to
Columbia’s thermal protection system (tiles and RCC panels)by objects that fell
from the External Tank during launch? If Columbia had been damaged, was there
anything NASA could have done to ensure the safe return of Columbia’s crew?
• Is the Columbia Accident Investigation Board the best group to assist NASA in this
investigation, or should the White House have established a “blue-ribbon”
commission independent of NASA as was done following the Challenger tragedy
in 1986?
• What are the funding implications of the Columbia accident for the space shuttle
program, and for the space station program, which relies on the shuttle for assembly
and operation?
• Should permanent occupancy of the space station be suspended until the shuttle
system is operating again, or should the space station partners (the United States,
Russia, Europe, Japan, and Canada) indefinitely rely on Russian Soyuz and Progress
spacecraft to bring crews and cargo to space station?  (See CRS Issue Brief 93017.)
• If the decision is made to rely indefinitely on Russian spacecraft beyond those that
Russian already has agreed to provide at no cost to the other partners, who will pay
for them?  The Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178) prohibits NASA from
making payments to Russia, in cash or in kind, in connection with the space station
program unless the President certifies that Russia is not proliferating nuclear or
missile technologies to Iran.
• Should a replacement orbiter be built?  If so, how much will it cost and how long
will it take?  If not, can NASA service the Hubble Space Telescope and continue
assembly and operation of the space station with only three orbiters?
• Should efforts to develop an Orbital Space Plane be accelerated instead of building
a replacement for Columbia? 
• Are the benefits of human spaceflight worth the risks and costs?
Three congressional hearings have been held to date:  February 12 (joint hearing
Senate Commerce Committee/ House Science Committee); February 27 ( House Science
Committee); and May 14 (Senate Commerce Committee).
